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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Article VIII, Section 
5, of the Constitution of the State of Utah; Utah Code Section 
78-2-2(3)(i); and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
The issues presented by this appeal are: 
1. Whether the default judgment of $851,686.05, 
which was entered when Appellants were without counsel, is 
based upon insufficient and/or incompetent evidence as to 
damages of a speculative nature and should therefore be set 
aside to allow the Appellant, represented by counsel, to 
cross-examine the Respondents* affidavit witnesses and present 
evidence in defense of the Respondents' claims. 
2. Whether the trial court's conditioning of 
granting of relief from the default entered in this case upon 
the payment by the impecunious Appellants of the Respondents 
attorneys' fees claimed for obtaining the default, in the 
amount of $4,083,185, with a mandatory 30-day deadline, is an 
abuse of the court's discretion and a violation of the 
Appellant's rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
States of America and the Constitution of the State of Utah, as 
a denial of due process of law, equal protection of the law and 
access to the courts; 
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3. Whether the requirement that the Appellant pay 
$4,083.85 to the Respondents as a condition for granting relief 
from the default is contrary to general principles of law and 
to the case law precedent of the State of Utah; 
4. Whether this Court's decision if Sovereen v. 
Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (1979), is controlling in holding that in 
a case such as this it would be an abuse of discretion for the 
trial judge to condition the setting aside of a default upon 
the payment of attorneys' fees of such a large amount. 
5. Whether the Complaint upon which a default 
judgment was entered was defective on its face because, when it 
was filed as a separate case in Davis County prior to its 
consolidation with this case in Salt Lake County, it 
constituted a compulsory counterclaim in this case; 
6. Whether a default judgment can award relief that 
is contrary to law and which could not be awarded in a judgment 
on a trial of the case on its merits; specifically, whether the 
default judgment entered for "unpaid capital contributions to a 
partnership" is void because there is no such thing under 
partnership law in the State of Utah or elsewhere as an 
involuntary capital contribution to a partnership, the remedy 
at law for the failure of a partner to respond to a call for 
additional capitol being the proportionate reduction of the 
non-paying partner's share and not a forced contribution of 
additional capitol enforced by the judgment and order of a 
court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a suit brought in Salt Lake County Third 
District Court by the Appellants Roy Bosley and his 
wholly-owned corporation, D.C.G., Inc., (hereinafter sometimes 
collectively referred to as "Bosley") to collect amounts due 
and unpaid by the Respondents, or some of them, for 
construction management services provided by Bosley pursuant to 
contract; to recover accounting, tax, and other records 
belonging to Bosley and held by the Respondents; for an 
accounting of partnership profits; and for other relief. 
The Respondents, prior to filing an answer to Bosley's 
Complaint in Third District Court filed a suit in the Second 
District Court of Davis County, based on the same transactions, 
occurrences and relationships as the Salt Lake County case, 
seeking damages for "unpaid partnership contributions" to an 
alleged partnership, damages for alleged cost overruns, delays 
and poor workmanship in a construction project, and for 
injunctive relief. 
After the two cases were consolidated in Salt Lake 
County under the earlier filed Salt Lake County case, the 
Respondents filed an answer and counterclaim to the Appellant's 
Complaint, designating their Davis County Complaint as the 
counterclaim, and also filing what they called an "amended 
complaint" in the Salt Lake County action, denominating 
themselves as plaintiffs and the Appellants as defendants. The 
"amended complaint" was identical to the Davis County Complaint 
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and to the counterclaim in Salt Lake County. 
While Appellants were without counsel, their counsel 
having formally withdrawn from the case, the Respondents caused 
a default certificate to be entered on their -amended 
complaint," and later moved the court for entry of default 
judgment. 
The Appellants, now represented by new counsel, moved 
to vacate the default certificate. 
The court, hearing both motions together, denied the 
motion for entry of judgment and granted the motion to set 
aside the default, but conditioned on the Appellants9 paying 
Respondents attorneys fees incurred in obtaining the default. 
The Respondents prepared an order for the courts' 
signature awarding themselves over $4,000 in attorneys fees and 
making the payment of the fees within 30 days a condition for 
setting aside the default. 
The Appellants objected to the proposed order on the 
grounds, inter alia, that they were impecunious and could not 
pay the fees in the 30 days allowed. 
The Third District Court entered the order over the 
Appellants* objections and, 30 days later when the $4,000 fees 
had not been paid, entered judgment by default against the 
Appellants for $852,686.05 on the one count and $43,189.21 on 
another count. 
The Appellants appealed from both the order, 
conditioning relief from the default on the payment within 30 
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days of the $4,083.85, and from the judgment subsequently 
entered of over $850,000.00 for, inter alia, unpaid capital 
contributions to a partnership. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 20, 1986, the Appellants Roy Bosley and 
his closely held corporation, D.C.G., Inc., originally filed 
the case below, Bosley, et al. v. Sprinqwood Associates, et 
al., Case No. C87-0336 in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, seeking to collect amounts due and unpaid by 
the Respondents, or some of them, for construction management 
services provided by Bosley pursuant to contract; to recover 
accounting, tax, and other records belonging to Bosley and held 
by the Respondents; for an accounting of partnership profits, 
and for other relief. 
On February 12, 1987, the defendants in the Sprinqwood 
case, including the principals, Messrs. Smoot and Kjar, filed 
the case of West Evanston Development, et al. v. Bosley, et 
al., in the Second District Court of Davis County. The subject 
matter of the Davis County case arose from the same 
transactions and occurrences as the previously filed Salt Lake 
County case, and the case was seeking damages for "unpaid 
partnership contributions- to an alleged partnership, damages 
for alleged cost overruns, delays and poor workmanship in a 
construction project, and for injunctive relief. 
In November of 1987, the cases were consolidated under 
Bosley v. Sprinqwood, Case No. C87-0336 in the Third District 
Court. 
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On December 21, 1987, the Respondents filed an answer 
and a counterclaim. The counterclaim adopted the Davis County 
Complaint in its entirety as a counterclaim, they also filed an 
"Amended Complaint", identical in all respects to the version 
adopted as the counterclaim, as a separate "Amended Complaint", 
in the Salt Lake County action denominating themselves as 
Plaintiffs and Bosley as Defendant. 
On February 1, 1988, Bosley*s then counsel filed a 
Notice of Withdrawal in this action. 
On March 9, 1988, counsel for the defendants 
Springwood Associates, Smoot, Kjar, et al., caused a default 
certificate to be entered against Bosley. This was done while 
Bosley was without counsel. 
On March 18, 1988, Bosley's present counsel entered 
his appearance as attorney for Bosley. 
On April 8, 1988, the defendants Springwood 
Associates, Smoot, Kjar, et al., filed a Motion for Entry of 
Default Judgment on their "Amended Complaint." 
On May 3, 1988, Bosley filed his Motion to Set Aside 
the Default Judgment. 
On May 6, 1988, the Third District Court, Hon. Richard 
H. Moffat heard the motion of Springwood Associates, Smoot, 
Kjar, et al., for Entry of Default Judgment and the Motion of 
Bosley to Set Aside the Default. The court denied the Motion 
for Entry of Judgment, granted the Motion to Set Aside the 
Default and awarded attorney's fees to the 
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Defendants-Counterclaimants, Springwood, Smoot, Kjar, et al. 
On June 17, 1988, the court heard Bosley's Objection 
to the Proposed Order prepared by counsel for Springwood, 
Smoot, Kjar, et al., on the grounds that the attorney's fees 
awarded in the proposed order were excessive, and that the 
requirement in the proposed Order that the awarded attorney's 
fees be paid within 30 days as a condition to the setting aside 
of the Default was beyond the scope of Judge Moffat's ruling at 
the hearing on the Motions for Default Judgment and to Set 
Aside Default, and that the requirement of the payment of such 
a large fee as a condition to filing an answer to an $850,000 
default judgment was manifestly unfair. 
On August 27, Judge Moffat issued his Decision on the 
Motions, which was entered as a Minute Entry by the court on 
August 29, 1988. The decision held that " . . . the court 
awards attorney's fees in the sum of $4,803.85 to the 
above-named plaintiffs [Defendants-Counterclaimants?] and the 
payment of such is ordered within 30 days from the date hereof 
as a precondition to granting the order setting the defaults." 
On September 9, 1988, Judge Richard Moffat signed an 
order prepared by counsel for Springwood, Smoot, Kjar, et al., 
which was entered by the clerk of the court on September 12, 
1988. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS; 
ORDINANCES OR RULES 
RULE 55(c) 
For good cause shown, the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default 
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in 
accordance with Rule 60(b). 
RULE 60(b) 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; . . . or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. . . . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants contend that it is an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to make the paying of attorney's fees a 
condition for setting aside a default in a case where the court 
has determined that it is proper to set aside the default, and 
the amount of the required attorney's fees is so large that an 
impecunious defendant can neither pay the required attorney's 
fees, nor raise the required amount in the period of time 
prescribed by the court's order. Setting impossible or 
extremely difficult financial conditions, with respect to 
amount and time of payment, as a prerequisite to the setting 
aside of a default to allow a party who was not represented by 
counsel when the default was entered to assert claimed 
defenses, amounts to an unconsitutional denial of access to the 
courts to persons with limited funds, and is not in accordance 
7.1 
with the purpose of the rules governing default judgments and 
not in accordance with the case law of the State of Utah. 
The Appellants also contend that a plaintiff ought not 
to be able to obtain a judgment by default which would be 
unattainable in a trial on the merits of the case. The 
complaint upon which the default judgment in this case was 
based was filed when the subject matter of the complaint 
constituted a compulsory counterclaim in a suit filed by the 
opposing party previously in another county, and asks for a 
court enforced mandatory capital contribution on the part of a 
partner, in contravention of the partnership agreement and 
general principles of law. 
7.2 
ARGUMENT 





IS NOT REPRESENTED BY 
DISCRETION FOR 
THE GRANTING OF RELIEF 
THE 
FROM 
COUNSEL -. IT IS 




PAYMENT WITHIN 3 0 DAYS OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN 
EXCESS OF $4,000. 
It has long been the policy of this Court that doubts 
should be resolved in favor of setting aside default judgments 
to permit parties to have their day in court. Unless there are 
unusual circumstances present, it is inequitable and unjust to 
condemn a party unheard. Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 
303 P.2d 995 (1956). The purpose of the default judgments is 
not to settle disputes by determining only which party is more 
diligent in following procedural rules, but rather to provide 
an efficient mechanism for avoiding delay when there is no 
genuine resistance to the claims of the plaintiff on the part 
of the defendant, and to provide a self-executing disciplinary 
device for enforcing obedience to the authority of served 
process. 
Where the defendant has valid defenses which he 
desires to assert, default judgment serves no purpose. Where 
the defendant is not "thumbing his noseH at the authority of 
the process of the court, but rather, retains counsel to defend 
him, punishing the defendant by default judgment is misplaced 
discipline. And when the defendant's retained counsel, who has 
neglected for months to file an answer to the plaintiffs 
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Complaint, dumps his client for failure to keep up the pace on 
payment of fees, and then counsel for the plaintiff takes 
advantage of the situation to have a default certificate 
entered in the gap while the defendant is without counsel, a 
failure of the court to set aside the default on the 
application of the defendant's replacement counsel would be 
manifest abuse of the discretion of the court. 
This Court has held that it is an abuse of discretion 
for a trial court to refuse to vacate a default judgment where 
timely application is made and there is any reasonable grounds 
for doing so. Chrysler v. Chrysler, id.; Ney v. Harrison, 5 
Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114; Bvlund v. Cook. 60 Utah 285, 208 P. 
504. 
In the instant case, counsel for Appellants entered 
his appearance in the case without knowing that counsel for the 
Respondents had caused a default certificate to be entered in 
the case only days before, without notice to the Appellant or 
Appellants' prior counsel. When subsequently counsel for the 
Respondents noticed their motion for entry of judgment on the 
default, counsel for Appellants immediately filed the motion to 
set aside the default. There can be no question as to 
timeliness; the motion to set aside the default and the motion 
for entry of judgment were heard at the same time. 
The grounds for setting aside a default judgment 
include those listed in Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure: Mgood cause" for setting aside a default, 
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and, if a judgment has been entered, "any . . . reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment," 
including mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect• Ample 
grounds were given in the Appellant's Motion to Set Aside The 
Default, and the trial court properly found sufficient grounds 
and granted the motion. 
The conditioning of the granting of relief from the 
default on the payment, within 30 days, of attorneys' fees in 
an amount greater than the Appellants could raise, however, 
effectively took away the relief from the default which the 
trial court, by granting the motion, found was proper in the 
case. 
A court in granting a motion to open or vacate a 
judgment may, within reasonable limits, impose terms. 46 AmJur 
2d, Judgments, § 784 at 945. Courts have divided on the issue 
of whether the payment of costs can be a condition precedent to 
an order opening a default. Id. Courts holding that the 
imposition as a condition to vacating a default judgment of the 
requirement that the defaulting party pay a proper fee to the 
opposing party's counsel hold that the fee award must be 
reasonable, id. at 946. If the fee is so large that the 
defaulting party cannot pay it, then the amount of the fee, as 
a pre-condition to setting aside the default, is manifestly 
unreasonable. The fee may be "reasonable" in the sense that it 
is related to the amount of work done by counsel for the 
non-defaulting party, and, as such, could properly be added to 
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the judgment after the trial of the case in the event that the 
non-defaulting party becomes the prevailing party. But this 
does not make the fee a reasonable condition to setting aside a 
default. A claimed attorneys' fee may be reasonably related to 
the amount of hours spent by attorneys working on the case, and 
still be a totally unreasonable amount to require be paid 
within 30 days of impecunious parties who file, as they did in 
the instant case, affidavits attesting to their inability to 
pay. 
A leading Utah case in point is Pitts v. Pine Meadow 
Ranch, Inc., 589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978). In Pitts, this Court 
stated that, in considering whether to set aside a default 
judgment, the district court should exercise its discretion 
liberally in favor of the defendant unless such exercise would 
result in injustice or inequity to the plaintiff, and condition 
the setting aside of a default judgment on the payment of 
certain costs because those costs would directly result from 
the setting aside of the default judgment. In order for the 
matter to be heard, in the event that the default was set 
aside, the plaintiffs in Pitts, would have to return to this 
country from England, a large cost directly related to setting 
aside the default, which cost could be a hardship and inequity 
to the plaintiffs. In the instant case, in contrast, the only 
hardship is to the law firm representing the Respondents, if 
delaying an award of attorneys fees until the entry of Judgment 
can property be termed a hardship. 
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It is also important to note at this juncture that, 
unlike Pitts, or the cases discussed in the above AmJur 
annotation, the motion to set aside the default in this case 
was made before judgment was entered. The motion of the 
Appellants to set aside the entry of default was made as soon 
as the fact of the entry of default was made known by the 
attorneys for the Respondents. The motion could have been 
heard and decided prior to the Respondents1 motion for judgment 
costs of $4,000 (plus) had been incurred. If the cost of 
presenting their motion for judgment had been a hardship or an 
inequity upon the Respondents, they could have easily avoided 
such hardship by postponing the hearing on their motion for 
judgment on the default until after the Appellants' motion to 
set aside the default had been heard and decided by the trial 
court. 
II. A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MAY NOT PROPERLY AWARD RELIEF 
WHICH WOULD NOT BE PROPER IN A JUDGMENT ENTERED 
AFTER TRIAL OF THE CASE ON ITS MERITS: JUDGMENT 
BY DEFAULT AWARDING DAMAGES FOR AN UNPAID CAPITAL 
CONTRIBUTION TO A PARTNERSHIP IS IMPROPER BECAUSE 
NO SUCH REMEDY EXISTS UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, OR ELSEWHERE. 
In Sovereen v. Meadows. 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979), this 
Court held that where the failure to state a claim appeared 
clearly on the face of the Complaint, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the trial judge to condition setting aside of a 
default judgment on the defendant's paying attorney's fees. 
If, in other words, the plaintiff could not get the relief 
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prayed for after a trial, he should not be able to get that 
same relief by default. 
In the instant case, there are two defects which are 
apparent on the face of the Complaint. One, the Complaint upon 
which the default was entered, and upon which judgment was 
entered, was filed in Davis County after the commencement of 
the Appellants' case against the Respondents in Salt Lake 
County. The subject matter of the Complaint arose from the 
same transactions and occurrences as that of the Salt Lake 
County action, and therefore, the Davis County Complaint 
constituted a compulsory counterclaim in the Salt Lake County 
action. The Appellants should not have had to answer that 
Complaint at all; rather, the Rules of Civil Procedure 
contemplate that the Respondents' claims be filed as a 
counterclaim and dealt with by the Appellant in a reply to a 
counterclaim in the existing action, in which both parties were 
already "in court". Had the Appellants, when they were without 
counsel, failed to timely respond to the Respondents' 
counterclaim, that could have been dealt with appropriately as 
needed by the Court in the action which was already joined. 
Entering a Default Judgment of close to $900,000 on a "Amended 
Complaint" which was, itself, improperly filed, would not have 
been the appropriate way for the court to deal with the 
tardiness of the then unrepresented Appellant in responding to 
a counterclaim. 
The second facial defect of the Respondents' "Amended 
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Complaint" is that it requests that the Court award a remedy 
which is contrary to law, and unavailable; a forced-compulsory 
capital contribution by a partner to a partnership. There is 
simply no such thing at law or equity in this jurisdiction or 
any other. 
The judgment in this case includes an amount of 
$94,000 to reimburse the West Evanston Development Partnership 
for amounts that the partnership borrowed because the 
Appellants did not respond affirmatively to the request of the 
partnership that it increase its capital account by $94,000. 
In other words, when the partnership was unsuccessful in 
obtaining new capital from the Appellants, they had to borrow 
elsewhere. Even if the Bosley had an obligation to provide 
additional funding to the partnership, which he did not, the 
measure of damages for not doing so would not be the full 
$94,000 which the partnership claims it had to borrow. As it 
is, neither the Appellant nor any other partner in any business 
partnership has, in the absence of a specific agreement to do 
so. The West Evanston Development Joint Venture Agreement 
itself provides that the other partners may contribute the 
non-contributing partner's share of a capital call in which 
case they will be entitled to reimbursement and interest 
payable only from the non-contributing partner's share of net 
receipts or funds available for distribution and then only to a 
limited extent. See paragraph 6.3 of Exhibit "A" to Complaint 
in West Evanston Development, et al. v. Bosley, et al.. Second 
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District Court Case No. CV-40931. There cannot be any 
obligation to put up additional capital in amounts unforeseen 
at the time the partnership was formed. Yet, that is exactly 
what $94,000 worth of the judgment is for. 
-Damages in the amount of $94,060 for capital 
borrowed by W.E.D. to cover capital calls made 
to, but unpaid by, Bosley." Plaintiffs* Amended 
Motion For Entry Of Default Judgment, p. 4. 
Under the law of partnerships in the State of Utah and 
elsewhere, if a partner is unable or unwilling to contribute 
additional capital to the partnership in response to a capital 
"call'1, while other partners do respond to the capital call and 
contribute additional capital, the percentage of ownership of 
the non-contributing partner is adjusted downward to reflect 
the ratio of his capital account to the total capital of the 
partnership as increased by the contributions of those partners 
responding to the capital call. There is no such thing as a 
mandatory capital contribution. If the non-contributing 
partner continues to fail to respond to repeated needs for 
additional capital, as determined by the partnership majority, 
then his percentage ownership in the partnership continues to 
go down as other partners make contributions of additional 
capital which he does not match. But, the non-contributing 
partner does not become liable and subject to a judgment at law 
for all amounts which the majority decides he should contribute 
in addition to his original investment, and no valid judgment, 
-15-
by default or otherwise, can be based upon such a false notion 
of partnership accounting and partnership law. See generally. 
Agency and Partnership, Reuschlein and Gregory's Handbook On 
The Law Of, 1979, West Publishing Company. 
There are additional problems with the judgment. 
. . the amount of $232,545.55 for costs to repair damage to 
W.E.D.'s 'Pines of Yellow Creek' Apartment Complex . . ." 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Default, Q&. Cit., p. 4 does 
not represent an actual cost of repairing any actual damage, 
but is the affidavit opinion of an "expert", not subjected to 
qualification as an expert, and not subject to 
cross-examination; "Damages in the amount of $525,080.50 for 
cost overruns which occurred due to Bosley's and D.C.G.9s 
negligent and mismanaged construction of the project," (ill. pp. 
4 and 5) is added to the judgment in spite of the fact that the 
contract of Bosley and D.C.G., the Appellants herein, with 
regard to that particular project, does not make Bosley and 
D.C.G. a general contractor nor a construction manager on the 
project but is, rather, for construction consulting services. 
See Exhibit "C" to the Complaint in West Evanston Development, 
et al. v. Bosley, et al.. Second District Court Case No. 
CV-40931, especially 1[ "C" of the "Recitals": D.C.G. . . . is 
engaged in providing development and construction management 
consulting services." These matters can be addressed, and 
evidence presented, when the case is tried. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because it is an abuse of the trial court's discretion 
to grant a default judgment of approximately $900,000 against 
an impecuious party because he fails to pay, within 30 days, 
attorneys fees in excess of $4,000, in a case where the court 
has found that it is proper to set aside the entry of default 
against that party; and because a default judgment should not 
award relief to the non-defaulting party which is contrary to 
law and which could not properly be awarded to that party after 
a trial of the case, and the request for which renders the 
Complaint or other pleading of the non-defaulting party void on 
its face, it is respectfully submitted that the Order and 
Judgment appealed from should be reversed, and this matter 
remanded to the District Court for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of May, 1989. 
EDWARD J. MCDONOUGH ^ 
50 South Main Street, #1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this Id day of May, 1989, I hereby certify that I 
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of the foregoing APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF to the following: 
Gregory S. Bell 
David M. Wahlquist 
James J. Cassity 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
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